Wittgenstein's notorious sample of a 'complete primitive language' (viz. the builders' game of the Philosophical Investigations) is often thought to be closer in kind to animal forms of communication than human language. Indeed, it has been criticised on precisely these grounds. But such debates make little sense if we take seriously Wittgenstein's idea that language is a family resemblance concept. So, rather than argue that the builders' game 'really is a language' (or not), I propose to turn the debate on its head and welcome the comparison.
for example, Wittgenstein tells us that he wants to "… regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct to but not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough for a primitive means of communication need no apology from us. Language did not arise out of some kind of ratiocination."
4 And in other places he discusses Wolfgang Köhler's attempts to prove that chimpanzees can think, expressing agreement that these are indeed examples of cognition, albeit in a primitive form.
5
My concern is primarily with this second strand in Wittgenstein's thought. In particular, I am interested in the implications that a proper understanding of it has for debates regarding the origins of language. Here the difficulty is that, on the one hand, human beings are seen to be the product of natural selection, thus related in fundamentally important respects to our non-human biological ancestors. And yet, as Chomsky is wont to point out, " [t] here does not seem to be anything homologous (that is, biologically related) or even analogous… [to language] in other related species…
The language faculty appears to be biologically isolated in a curious and unexpected sense."
6
The problem is not limited to the Chomskyan paradigm. Even those that reject the conception of language as a primarily biological phenomenon nevertheless see a categorical divide between human and animal forms of communication. Michael Tomasello, for example, contends that, " [whereas] animal signals are aimed at the behavior and motivational states of others, […] human symbols are aimed at the attentional and mental states of others. It is this mental dimension that gives linguistic symbols their unparalleled communicative power, enabling them to be used to refer to and to predicate all kinds of diverse perspectives on objects, events, and situations in the world." 7 On this view, even the baby utterances 'more-juice' and 'doggie gone' differ in fundamental respects from the communicative structures of non-human animals -at least as they exist in the wild. 8 In what follows I am going to try to go some way towards dissolving the appearance of incommensurability. Using Wittgenstein's notorious sample of a 'complete primitive language' (viz.
the builders' game of the Philosophical Investigations), I argue that the learning of language is crucially dependent upon communicative forms that have much in common with those found in other species.
To this end, I begin by describing three systems of animal communication with which we can draw 4 (1972: §475); Cf. (Z §391) 5 See, e.g., (1980a: §561) and (1980b: § §224-5) 6 (2001: 4) 7 (2003: 8) 8 I am here bracketing debates over the abilities of animals raised in captivity and trained in rudimentary linguistic skills. See, e.g., Savage-Rumbaugh et al (1993) ; Cf. Corballis (2011) . Though the issues raised by the results of such studies are immensely interesting, they are also controversial and I shall not discuss them further.
comparison ( §2). I then suggest that many of the common features shared by these systems are also present in Wittgenstein's builders, and detail two objections that have been levelled at the example on precisely these grounds ( §3). I proceed to outline a reading of these passages according to which the objections miss its central point, namely, the foundational role that instruction plays in a child's enculturation into language ( § §4-5). Drawing on work by Danièle Moyal-Sharrock and others, I argue that the example disarms certain conceptual challenges to the very idea of language acquisition ( §6), before discussing how lessons drawn from the builders may shed light on empirical work on language's phylogenetic origins ( §7). I bring the discussion to a close with some concluding remarks ( §8). §2
Honeybees do not speak; but they do, like us, communicate. Through a form of dance, worker bees intimate vital information about the whereabouts of potential resources to the hive. Though the information that is conveyed is relatively simple, the efficacy of their system of communication requires that both distance and direction be discernible from the signals that the bees give. But honeybees do not point, nor do they make use of an abstract notion of number. Rather, the bee dance has evolved in such a way that the distance to the location is correlated with the length of the dance, the direction of the resource indicated by the angle of the dance relative to the sun.
9
Like honeybees, black-capped chickadees communicate with one another, though not through dance. Rather, they make use of vocalisations both to attract mates and to transmit predator information amongst the flock. In the latter context, the information that is conveyed is surprisingly diverse. For instance, the presence of specific acoustic features (frequency, call duration, etc.) is directly related to the level of threat posed by the predator. Thus, a pygmy owl (high threat) elicits twice as many 'chick-a-dee' calls as does a great grey owl (low threat), and in response to each, a proportionate level of mobbing behaviour occurs. Similarly, different kinds of calls are elicited in response to contrasting situations. So, for example, the chickadees will sing a 'seet' alarm call in response to a flying raptor, while producing a 'chick-a-dee' mobbing call in response to the same predator in a different context. The respective responses (flight or fight) being more or less appropriate to the situation faced.
10
Though honeybees could hardly be more distant in relation to human beings, and chickadees only marginally closer, the calls of our far more intimate relative, the vervet monkey, are not 9 The example is drawn from Cadena (2011) . 10 The example is drawn from Templeton et al (2005) .
significantly more complex. Like the honeybee, vervets make use of signals to convey information useful to the survival of the troop; in this case, they alert one another to the presence of their most common predators by means of acoustically distinct vocalisations. 11 And, like the chickadee, the behavioural reactions to these alarm calls are highly specialised. For example, upon hearing the bark associated with the presence of a leopard, vervets typically run into nearby trees where they cannot be reached. By contrast, the 'rraup' call produced in response to martial eagles results in a different reaction, namely, that of leaving the trees and running into the thick bush.
12
Examples such as these are not novel. Indeed, primitive forms of animal communication have been recognised at least since the time of Aristotle. 13 What is usually denied, however, is that such forms are analogous, let alone equivalent, to language. But why? Is there an essential difference between these primitive systems and mature human languages?
Here one might point to the fact that the English calls are elliptical sentences and can therefore express thought in a way that the chickadee calls (e.g.) cannot. For, what I mean when I say 'Run!' is really: 'You should run'. But this sentence has a syntactic structure that the chickadee vocalisations lack. After all, simply repeating a call hardly qualifies as constructing a sentence, even if subtle differences in frequency, interval gap and duration are admitted as affecting the information conveyed.
But since sentences are the basic medium of meaning in any language, 14 the chickadee calls cannot be genuinely linguistic. Furthermore, if one were to argue that the structure is hidden, lying in the thoughts behind their vocalisations, it would be quite remarkable that the chickadees could not say, e.g., 'Do not run!'. That is, if their thought was the same as ours in this context, we would expect specific logical features to appear in their systems of communication (such as negation) -but they do not.
Not only do these signals seemingly fail to express thought, they also differ from human language in so far as they are not aimed at influencing the thought of others. For human communicators (at least according to a prominent view) use language to influence one another, not directly, but indirectly by calling the listener's attention to objects in the world. Accordingly, communication by means of language involves a complex triadic relationship between speaker, listener and outside referent in which interactions have the structure: 'I intend for you to share attention 11 Seyfarth et al (1980) 12 It is worth noting that the animals were also tested using recordings of the calls given in the absence of the predatory threat. Because the results remained consistent, the behaviour cannot be explained without reference to the calls themselves. See (ibid) . 13 See, e.g., his remarks in On the Parts of Animals (1961: 660a35-b2 ). 14 One way to reach this conclusion would be to accept a strong version of Frege's context principle to the effect that words have meaning only in the context of a sentence. Cf. Frege (1953: xxii) .
on/about X'. For example, when a human calls out 'Leopard!', the primary intention is to change another's belief state about the presence of danger in the environment, thus allowing the receiver to make a decision about how to react. By contrast, vervet vocalisations (e.g.) seem to lack any such sophistication. They will keep producing their alarm calls in response to a predator even if the rest of the troop is clearly present, looking at the source of danger, and making the same calls themselves.
According to Tomasello, Hauser et al (2002) argue that the recursive nature of grammar is the feature of human language that separates it from animal forms of communication. Cf. Everett (2005b) and Savage-Rumbaugh et al (1993 The Philosophical Investigations begins by introducing us to a 'picture of the essence of human language'. This picture is given to us through St. Augustine's seemingly commonplace reflections upon his introduction to words. Simplifying somewhat, the reflections suggest the following theses: i) words are names (sentences are concatenations of names); ii) the meaning of a word is the object that it refers to; and iii) ostensive definition is the primary form of language acquisition.
18
Wittgenstein says that this idea of the way that language functions is primitive. But one could also say, he suggests, "that it is the idea of a language more primitive than ours." 19 We are then invited
to conceive of what such a language might amount to:
The language is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and an assistant B. A is building with building stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass him the stones and to do so in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they make use of a language consisting of the words "block", "pillar", "slab", "beam". A calls them out; B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call. -Conceive of this as a complete primitive language. 20 What is both disconcerting and highly relevant for our purposes is that the most intuitive Supporting this reading is the ability to interpret the builders' game, not as a complete primitive language, but as a subset of our own; as the shorthand employed on a noisy building site for instance.
24
Because it is possible to make sense of the builders' utterances by juxtaposing the example against a background of a complicated form of life, we assume that it is likewise possible to imagine it as a constituting the entire communication system of a tribe. But now there are doubts about whether what we are describing is of the same kind (i.e., a form of human language). Are their words still names?
Unlike what we normally take a name to be, these calls cannot be used in the absence of their bearer.
25
Are the builders still people? They seem to be more like cavemen, plodding along with their task, faces blank, devoid of all emotion. As articulated by Warren Goldfarb, the purpose of the example is thus to show us that our reluctance to treating the builders as fully human and their calls as genuinely linguistic derives from "…the abrogation of the rest of language. This shows that our everyday applications of these notions presuppose the surroundings provided by the rest of language… When the surroundings are removed, the notions no longer operate quite rightly." 26 On Goldfarb's reading, then, Wittgenstein's suggestion that we conceive of the builders as employing a complete language is purposefully misleading since it presupposes that we can ignore the holistic framework -the 'rest of language' -that gives our words their meaning. The uncanny effect that the example is then meant to play on our imaginations is accordingly supposed to lead us to recognise the impossibility of taking language piecemeal, of divorcing it from its weave with the rest of our linguistic practices.
But the example can also be read much more straightforwardly, if not un-problematically.
Indeed, part of the appeal of Goldfarb's interpretation is that if we do take Wittgenstein at his word, then he is surely wrong to describe the builders' game as a language. Rush Rhees, for instance, offers several reasons for rejecting the example as genuinely linguistic. His chief concern, however, is that for them there is no difference between 'that is not what we normally do' and 'that makes no sense.' 27 23 (PI §25) 24 This suggestion is Cavell's (1996) . 25 (PI §45) 26 (1983: 272) 27 (1960: 178) This is problematic because, whereas an arrangement of stones never seen before might be regarded as ugly and thereafter forbidden, such new arrangements are not meaningless. "Unless there were a difference between learning to move stones in the ways people always do, and learning what makes sense, then I do not think we could say they were learning to speak." What started out as a worry about context (about the lack of diversity in the uses of the builders' calls, about the absence of normative standards needed to distinguish between sense and nonsense) has led straight into a worry about content. Speaking a language, it is now claimed, requires that the participants be able to articulate what it is that they mean, to be able to ask questions and to answer them. But being able to do such things presupposes that things can be asked, denied, said to be thus and so, and so on; this, however, requires a highly complex logico-grammatical structure, one in which assertions, questions, orders, denials, etc., can be distinguished.
30
Faced with these challenges, there are several courses that one might pursue. The first would be to accept them, thus rejecting Wittgenstein's assessment of his example and, perhaps, its import.
Another would likewise be to accept them, but to argue -as Goldfarb does -that this is intentional on Wittgenstein's part: that it is part of his therapeutic method of getting us to indulge our imaginations only to show us that we cannot really conceive of what we originally intended. But however valuable these responses may be in highlighting distinctive features of our own lives with language, it seems to me that both fail to appreciate the weight of Wittgenstein's insistence that language is a family resemblance concept. For, the central point of sections § §66ff. of the Philosophical Investigations is surely (and rightly) that our notion of a language is constituted by nothing other than a network of similarities that overlap and crisscross in interesting ways. Some of these features are present in the builders, while the others that we may have anticipated are not. But it is only for 28 Rhees (1960: 178) what follows from their absence? Though the preceding discussion has given us several candidate features, I am going focus on two in particular.
Recall that the first complaint that we considered in regards to animal signals centred on their lack of syntactic structure. The fact that they could not form sentences seemed to rule out the possibility that they could be genuinely linguistic. Wittgenstein anticipates a similar objection to the builders: "Is the call 'Slab!' in example (2) This chain of reasoning starts with commonplaces but ends in confusion. The hidden premise is, of course, that the sense of the shorter sentence is dependent on the longer one; that the four-word sentence is logically prior to the elliptical one. If this were so, our ability to mean 'Bring me a slab', would presuppose the syntactic resources capable of generating such a sentence (and now the question of where these resources come from becomes significant). Language cannot, so to speak, come piece by piece.
36
Wittgenstein aims to cut off these inferences before they can get started. For how has it come about that the dependence of the elliptical sentence on its extension runs that way? "Why", Wittgenstein asks, "shouldn't I conversely have called the sentence 'Bring me a slab' a lengthening of the sentence 'Slab!'?" 37 Well, comes the reply, because our call 'Slab!' really means 'Bring me a slab'.
-This is of course true, but empty. We say that 'A' means 'B' when there is some confusion about what 'A' means. And though we do not say " 'Bring me a slab' means 'Slab!' ", this is simply because 35 (PI §19) 36 Cf. Chomsky's remarks about the evolution of language: "…it is almost as if there was some higher primate wandering around a long time ago and some random mutation took place, maybe after some strange cosmic ray shower, and it reorganized the brain, implanting a language organ in an otherwise primate brain. That is a story, not to be taken literally. But it may be closer to reality than many other fairy tales that are told about evolutionary processes, including language." (2001: 4) 37 (PI §19) it is difficult to imagine a situation in which the latter would clarify the former to someone who did not understand it. insofar as these affect an expression's functioning; but in both the builders' game and the shorthand of a construction site (say), the use is exactly the same.
The lesson, then, is not that the builders' game really is a language (this, Wittgenstein would have thought, is a wrong question); rather, it is that the absence of syntax in this context does not, in itself, infringe upon their ability to use 'Slab!' to mean 'Bring me a slab'. What does have to be given up, though, is the idea that their calls are names of objects. For what the builders clearly cannot do is make use of 'Slab!' in a referential role; that is, as a word to talk about an object (or type of object).
They can only order an action to be performed and, what is more, can only do so in the presence of the object itself. Unlike a name, the paradigmatic use of which is to refer in the absence of its bearer, the builders' calls are bound up inextricably with their objects.
Thus, on the reading here outlined Wittgenstein's suggestion that we conceive of the builders' game as an example of a 'complete primitive language for which Augustine's description is right' is indeed treacherous. But, and this needs emphasising, it is so in a way unlike that described by Goldfarb.
The point of exercising our imaginations in this case is not for us to see that what we are imagining is no longer a language, but rather that it is not a case for which Augustine's description is right. §5
Nevertheless, the builders seemingly lack the capacity to explain what it is that they mean and, perhaps also, a distinction between sense and nonsense. And this leads to the second objection that I wish to consider. For could one not protest along the lines outlined by Rhees that the lack of a distinction between 'that is not what we normally do' and 'that is senseless' rules out the possibility that they can accurately be described as speaking?
The worry Rhees seems to have is that the lack of such a distinction blurs an essential difference between human and animal forms of communication. What I have in mind is a form of instruction, and therewith normativity, that is embodied.
Consider the difference between these two kinds of teaching:
(1) A says to B: 'When I say 'slab' you are to pick up that ( she understands it, can use it to guide her future actions. This is the kind of normativity that Rhees has in mind above. But since this is obviously not possible for the builders, their form of instruction must, I think, look more like (2). This is why Wittgenstein is quick to distinguish the kind of instruction that is available to them from more advanced forms:
[They] are brought up to perform these actions, to use these words as they do so, and to react in this way to the words of others.
An important part of the training will consist in the teacher's pointing to the objects, directing the child's attention to them, and at the same time uttering a word; for instance, the word 'slab' as he displays that shape. (I do not want to call this 'ostensive explanation' or 'definition', because the child cannot as yet ask what the name is…) 44 What makes the activity normative is the way the child's behaviour becomes constrained: it is shaped within the pedagogical context to conform to the directives of the teacher. 45 But since the teacher is not capable of citing further words to explain what to do (since the child would not understand them), the normativity will be based primarily around reward and punishment. Crucially, however, the child need not intellectualise the fact that she has done something wrong. She does not need to think about what the slap 'means', but can simply react naturally -in much the same way, in fact, as an animal might. Wittgenstein writes: "I am using the word 'trained' in a way strictly analogous to that in which we talk of an animal being trained to do certain things. It is done by means of example, reward, punishment, and suchlike." 46 The immensely significant point in all of this is that it is through such training that the child may come to understand the meaning of the call. This is normativity, instruction, and understanding in their most primitive forms.
We are now in a position to see the positive role that the example is meant to play in the Investigations. As I argued in the preceding section, the example has the negative conclusion that, even in the simplest of cases, Augustine's description fails. But Wittgenstein also uses it to set up the important relationship between these rudimentary activities that "A child uses […] when he learns to talk", 47 and the more complicated forms of language that characterise our lives. For, while Rhees is right that in such simple contexts there is no such thing as explaining the meaning of a word (in the technical sense canvassed above), he does not seem to realise that the capacity to ask for the meaning of a word, the ability to explain what one means with other words, etc., is dependent upon the primitive forms of learning that are available to the builders. Wittgenstein's argument is that, rather than constituting the fundamental form of language acquisition (as Augustine's description suggests), ostensive explanation (or definition) presupposes that the initiate understand the general role of the word in the language-game (i.e. whether it is a colour word, number word, etc.). Ostensive explanation, he suggests, "is […] a language game in its own right." 48 Indeed, it is one of the most important. But then it cannot be learned in the same way, on pain of regress. 49 It is built, rather, upon the kinds of primitive communicative contexts that lie at the foundation of our languages (of which the builders' game is but one example). §6
These points suggest a picture of the ontogenetic origins of linguistic communication that runs contrary to claims that you must know a language in order to learn one. 50 For if what has been said up to now is on point, the kinds of language games that the builders embody demonstrate the possibility of acquiring primitive linguistic skills through forms of instruction that do not presuppose the linguistic competence of the initiate learner. 46 (1969: 77) 47 (PI §5) 48 (PI §27) 49 For an elaboration of the argument, see Medina (2002: 165-173) . 50 The reference is, of course, to Fodor (1975: 63-64) . But also see and cf. Chomsky (1965: 25) .
The objection that is likely to arise at this stage, however, is that even if it is admitted that such forms of training serve to initiate a child into language, it is nevertheless opaque how one can move from such primitive reactions to fully intentional speech. Rhees writes:
If you see someone who has been knocked down, and see that his leg is giving him great pain, you may call to him, ask him, and ask other people who come along […] ; also: if you saw that I had seen the man knocked down and that I could see that his leg was hurting him terribly, and that I just Others, however, have gone some way towards doing so in a manner entirely consistent with what has been said up to now. 52 If, on the other hand, it is meant to amount to a philosophical challenge -to imply that there is some sort of incoherence in the suggestion that such forms of speech might emerge from instinctive reactions -then Wittgenstein himself provides an answer:
[H]ow does a human being learn the meaning of the names of sensations? -of the word 'pain' for example. Here is one possibility: words are connected with the primitive, the natural, expressions of the sensation and used in their place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behaviour. 53 He also suggests that similar things could be said in response to the question 'How is the connection between name and thing named set up?' And this, I take it, is similar again to the question of how the triadic relation between speaker, listener, and outside referent -the relation characteristic of many mature uses of language -develops. Let us flesh this idea out with a snapshot of what such a developmental trajectory might look like in practice.
i. A child is placed in a high-chair and fed juice. Her juice is then taken away and she cries.
'Do you want more juice?', her father asks, waving the juice box in front of her. She reaches for the juice and he gives her some more. She stops crying.
ii. The same child, now a bit older, is placed in her high-chair and fed juice. When it is taken away she exclaims 'more juice!' Her father gives her more, which she happily accepts.
51 (1997: 2) 52 See Montgomery (2002) for an account inspired by considerations similar to those discussed above. 53 (PI  §244) iii. The child, a bit older still, is being carried off to bed. 'More juice!' she exclaims. 'But you've already had juice', her father says. 'More juice!', she repeats. She is then placed in her highchair and given juice. But she does not drink. 'Ok, back off to bed then.' -'More juice!'
iv. The child is even older now. She is placed in a booster seat and asked 'Are you thirsty?' -'More juice!' -'Ok, which would you like, pineapple (o) or grape (o)?' She points to the grape juice. 'Don't point', her father says. 'Say: "grape juice".' -'Grape juice!' She is given the grape juice. 'Good. This (o) is called "grape juice." ' This, it seems to me, is a banal description of the sort of interaction that one might expect to observe between a father and his daughter at various points in the latter's ontogeny. At the first stage, the child's behaviour is little more than that of a pup straining for milk, or a chick crying out with hunger; accordingly, its production does not presuppose the psychologically complex communicative intent of mature language users -as Danièle Moyal-Sharrock emphasises, it is spontaneously expressive, not goal directed. 54 But it is nevertheless a primitive communicative context in which the child makes her feelings known and where, like the builders' calls, 'More juice' becomes associated with its object. In time (so our story assumes) the child will learn to replace her instinctive crying and grasping with words. But even at this second stage, the question of whether or not the communication is fully intentional is left unsettled. There is no need to over-intellectualise the child and hypothesise that her goal in such situations is to direct another's attention to an object. It may be, certainly, and experiments might confirm that it is (e.g. if the child stops making the exclamation when the adult is clearly trying but for some reason failing to get the juice); but it is also possible that the exclamation has simply replaced the crying and that the child will continue to make it so long as her desire remains.
A variation of degrees is, I think, imaginable here. Once we reach the third stage, however, the child's behaviour shows the primitive roots of deception: she does not want to go to bed and says 'More juice' in order not to. The natural locutions of goal-directed action are practically unavoidable.
From here the transition to referential uses of speech is again affected, not through theorising Fodor (1975: 63-64) through the activity of drinking juice, not by means of theorising about what words mean. And once this connection is firmly established, the ambiguity of ostensive explanation is nullified: the step to naming and, ipso facto, paradigmatically referential uses of language becomes possible. This is, admittedly, little more than a story; but it is not, I think, an unbelievable or even remarkable one. Moreover, I need not claim that a child's enculturation into language is everywhere like this. Rather, the point of the example is to demonstrate the possibility of coming to language without the resources afforded by its possession. Moyal-Sharrock summarises the general idea well:
[T]he child learns to replace his initial crying for food with intentional gesturing for food, and eventually with more sophisticated […] requests. The word replaces the gesture and takes over its function. It isn't that the word is now hooked or mapped on to the behaviour, but that it replaces it […] The infant's primitive crying is not goal-directed, but instinctively expressive; of course the infant will soon learn to 'direct' or stage its crying to serve a purpose, but that is a refinement of the primitive gesture. 56
If this is right then the intricate uses of language that Rhees discusses, while they may lie much further down a complex developmental road, nevertheless have a clear enough foundation in the instinctive behaviour of the pre-linguistic child. §7
Our discussion began with three examples of animal communication and, before drawing the discussion to a close, I want to briefly comment on the phylogenetic implications of all this. For, although I have been consistently emphasising the similarities between the builders' game and the three examples, the possibility of shaping another's communicative behaviour by means of instruction does I think represent a significant difference. Now, whether it is a difference between human and animal forms of communication generally is, of course, an empirical question and I shall not argue that the evidence is overwhelmingly in favour of it being so. 57 What I do want to comment on the importance of such a general difference, should that it be.
The significance lies in the potential expansion of the communicative system that the pedagogical context creates. For the capacity to instruct and -no less importantly -to learn from 56 (2010: 296) 57 But others have. See Tomasello (1999: 33ff.) and Boesch and Tomasello (1998) for arguments that instruction in non-human animals, if it exists all, is extremely rare.
instruction is bound up with the characteristic way that human cultural practices, including language, accumulate modifications over time. This is often referred to as the 'ratchet effect' since,
[…] a key aspect of the mechanism is that modifications are taken up by others faithfully and continue in faithful replication until still newer modifications come along. This faithful transmission is partly due to the especially powerful skills of social learning employed by human children […] , along with the fact that adults explicitly teach children things as well. 58 The instructional contexts that the builders embody provide the basis for the cultural ratchet since children learn, not simply how to proceed, but how one ought to proceed in relevantly similar circumstances. That is, instruction instils within the initiate learner a normative attitude towards what is being taught. As Schmidt and his colleagues explain, "Young children […] not only learn how to perform normatively rule-governed activities from adults, but they already understand them as rule governed and enforce these rules on third parties." 59 And as Tomasello and Herrmann report,
[…] when adults teach them things, children trust this so much they often jump to normative conclusions.
[…] For example, in a recent study, 3-year-old children who witnessed a puppet playing a game in a manner discrepant with the way they had been taught objected strenuously: The puppet was not doing it ''right''. 60 This makes human children the perfect vessel for the dissemination (and hence preservation) of the innovations and modifications that previous generations have made to the language which they will eventually inherit, and allows them to master complex techniques involving innovations that no single individual could invent (e.g., language).
61
By contrast, when communicative behaviours are not learnt, or are learnt but without the possibility of instruction, growth in the complexity of the communicative system as a whole is difficult to explain. The reasons for this require little comment in the case of unlearned behaviour: since its development is subject to the selection pressures of the environment, cumulative change happens on timescales orders of magnitude greater than the processes of cultural evolution. But the point is less obvious in regards to behaviour that is learnt outside of the pedagogical context. Why not think that 58 Schmidt et al (2011: 530) 59 (Ibid: 531) 60 (2010: 6) For the study itself see Rakoczy, Warneken, & Tomasello (2008) . 61 See and cf. Tomasello et al (1993 For just this reason it is often thought that true imitation is key in facilitating the cultural ratchet. 65 As typically understood, imitation is the process by means of which the animal learns through direct observation of another's behaviour (including its strategies and consequences) to execute similar behaviours and to achieve the related results. 66 It is thus easy to see why such a form of learning appears to provide a stable foundation for the maintenance of complex skills across time: if animals are capable of imitating one another, then it seems as if innovations will be copied, mastered, and passed on to future generations. But is imitation enough? It is not at all obvious that it is. The problem is that imitation does not require that the individuals acquire a normative attitude to what they learn:
rather than understanding a particular way of doing things as the 'right' one, individuals simply learn that it is a possible means of achieving some end. But if another technique (however acquired) works similarly well, there is nothing to prevent the animal from changing its method. As Heyes points out, this makes skills learnt through imitation liable to modification and erosion as a result of circumstantial environmental variables. And while this might be beneficial in the short term, it means that what gets passed on is not necessarily a generally improved technique, but simply a different one. It thus seems at least unlikely that imitation on its own could facilitate the cultural ratchet since it fails to insulate the acquired techniques from the other forms of learning available to the animal.
67
Unsurprisingly, I think, it is precisely this kind of insulation that is fostered by the teaching context. Indeed, I would argue that the transformation of regularities into rules makes little sense except against a background in which instruction plays at least a part. Of course, once the normative foundation is in place, imitative learning can and does play a key role in the faithful transmission of techniques -explicit instruction is not everywhere required. This is an important fact, but one that should not be overemphasised. For, if what has been said up till now is on point and the capacity to initiate children into the mastery of a technique proves to be uniquely human, then not only does
Wittgenstein's insistency on the primacy of instruction provide a way of understanding a child's enculturation into language, it also provides a conceptual foundation for much of the theoretical work on its phylogenetic origins. §8
Human beings are, like every other species, unique. And it is no doubt true that our capacity to use a rich language is part and parcel of that. But claims to the effect that there is nothing analogous to human forms of communication in any other animal species are simply untrue. This is not, I have argued, because animal forms of communication are more complex than we are inclined to think, but rather because human languages rest on a primitive form of communication that is animal in nature.
Under the reading that I have outlined, Wittgenstein's builders embody this primitive form and provide a model for understanding how a child might come to language without the resources afforded by its possession. This, I think, disarms the conceptual challenge about language acquisition posed, in different ways, by Rhees and Fodor: there is no good reason to think that there is anything conceptually problematic in the supposition that a child might develop linguistic skills without already having a language. 68 Admittedly, I have said nothing about 'poverty of the stimulus' arguments that aim to show, as a matter of fact, that there is an unbridgeable gulf between the linguistic input a child 67 (Ibid: 1004) 68 I should say that Rhees (1997: 13) explicitly claims to be in agreement with Malcolm's (1982) polemics against the idea that language is, or must be, innate. But it is difficult (for me) to see what alternative is available to him given his own avowed rejection of the notion that language could arise from primitive forms of behavior.
receives and the linguistic abilities they develop. 69 But, first, these empirical claims are consistently challenged; they are by no means as well established as they are often made out to be. 70 Second, there are alternative theories; universal grammar is no longer the only show in town. 71 And, finally, models which posit a specialised organ to explain the ontogenesis of language -while at the same time denying that there is anything analogous throughout the rest of nature -offer no plausible account of its phylogenetic origins. 72 To this end I have tried to show how lessons drawn from the builders might be put to use in understanding the cultural evolution of linguistic complexity. These remarks were speculative, but it seems to me that they are at least initially supported by empirical research. 73 
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